ch. v.] THE TWO ME 1 HODS. 105 



another German writer, it is an outburst of wrath on the 

 nart of the new-comer at finding himself powerless against 

 environing circumstances ! Wherein is all this better than 

 the cosmological vagaries of Plato ? Or wherein is it better 

 than the speculations of those early Christian theologians who 

 adduced the crying of the new-born babe in proof of its 

 innate wickedness, and erected thereupon an argument in 

 support of the doctrine that the unbaptized child is in danger 

 of damnation ? 



These wilder extravagances of the subjective method may 

 serve to illustrate for us the close kinship between meta- 

 physics and mythology, and to justify the pregnant observa- 

 tion of Mr. Chauncey Wright, that the method of the d priori 

 philosopher is but an evanescent form of the method employed 

 by the barbarian in constructing his quaint theories of the 

 universe. When deeply considered, the subjective method, 

 whether employed by the metaphysician or by the myth- 

 maker, will be seen to consist in following the lead of a train 

 of associated ideas, without pausing to test the validity of 

 the association by interpreting the ideas in terms of sensible 

 experiences, — or, in other words, without confronting the 

 order of conceptions with the observed or observable order of 

 phenomena. As I have elsewhere observed, "it is through 

 the operation of certain laws of ideal association that all 

 human thinking, that of the highest as well as that of the 

 lowest minds, is conducted ; the discovery of the law of 

 gravitation, as well as the invention of such a superstition as 

 the Hand of Glory, is at bottom but a case of association of 

 ideas. The difference between the scientific and the mytho- 

 logic inference consists solely in the number of checks which 

 in the former case combine to prevent any other tnan the 

 true conclusion from being framed into a proposition to which 

 the mind assents. Countless accumulated experiences have 

 taught the modern that there are many associations of ideas 

 «vhich do not correspond to any actual connection of cause 



