128 COSMIC miLOSOPIIY. [pt. L 



subjective and the objective methods. That the difference 

 in method is more fundamental than the difference in the 

 character of the objects which are studied, is shown by the 

 fact that " a theory may be transferred from metaphysics to 

 science, or from science to metaphysics, simply by the addition 

 or the withdrawal of its verifiable, element." Thus, as Mr. 

 Lewes observes, "the law of universal attraction becomes 

 pure metaphysics if we withdraw from it the verifiable 

 specification of its mode of operation. Withdraw the formula, 

 ' inversely as the square of the distance and directly as the 

 mass,' and Attraction is left standing — a mere 'occult quality.' 

 Indeed the Cartesians reproached it with being such an occult 

 quality, and stigmatized it as a revival of Aristotelianism. 

 On the other hand, add this verifiable formula to the 'inherent 

 virtue ' of the old metaphysicists, and the result is a strictly 

 scientific proposition." 1 



Here also is revealed the inherent weakness of meta- 

 physics: it is incapable of making discoveries. For veri- 

 fication is absolutely essential to discovery. No theorem 

 can be accepted as a discovery until it has been verified, 

 and the theorems of metaphysics do not admit of verification. 

 Hence the utter barrenness of the metaphysical method. 

 From Thales downwards — according to the current reproach 

 — philosophers have been disputing over the first principles 

 of their subject, and are now no nearer to a solution than 

 when they began to dispute. It is not, however, as is some- 

 times superficially supposed, because metaphysicians disagree, 

 that their method must be rejected by any philosophy which 

 would found itself upon science ; but it is because their 

 disagreement can never end in agreement,— can never lead 

 to knowledge. Since there will always be room for difference 

 of opinion on many subjects, until the human mind shall 

 have explained and classified all the phenomena of nature, 

 it cannot be demanded of any system of philosophy that it 

 1 Lewes, Aristotle, p. 84. 



