en. vi. j CAUSATION. 157 



dren and all savages, regard this as a conscious effort, 

 attended by volition, we still conceive it as an effort attended 

 by resistance. And from this anthropomorphism of thought 

 are derived two closely related, though apparently incompa- 

 tible, metaphysical theories 5 the theory that matter, regarded 

 as a cause, is endowed with an occulta vis ; and the theory 

 that matter, regarded as an effect, can move only under con- 

 straint from without. 



Such is the origin of our conception of power in causation. 

 Yet that the conception, as thus formulated, cannot corre- 

 spond to the external reality, is a truth so obvious, at the 

 present stage of our discussion, as hardly to need pointing 

 out. It is enough to remark that since effort, as known to 

 us, is only an affection of our consciousness, we cannot 

 conceive the wind which overturns a tree as exerting effort, 

 unless we mentally endow the wind with consciousness. 

 The primitive man did not scruple at this ; to him the Wind 

 was a superhuman person. We, who have outgrown fetishism, 

 must take the other horn of the dilemma, and admit that 

 whatever may be the force which the wind exerts, it cannot 

 be the force which we know as effort. By this alternative 

 difficulty we may recognize the fact that we have here again 

 come face to face with the Unknowable. What the process 

 of causation is in' itself we cannot know. We can know it 

 only as it is presented to our consciousness, as the uncon- 

 ditional invariable sequence of events. 



Our account of causation would not be complete without 

 some mention of an attempt which has again been made, of late 

 years, to pass beyond the limits of intelligence, and cognize 

 the external process in itself. This attempt, based upon an 

 imperfect apprehension of the foregoing analysis, starts with 

 the assertion that in our primitive consciousness of Power 

 we have a true cognition of an Efficient Cause. According 

 to this doctrine, the expectation that effort will overcome 

 resistance and cause motion is a bit of d priori knowledg« 



