168 COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. [rr. l 



not given in experience. In our consciousness of effort we 

 have direct knowledge of the causal nexus between the ante- 

 cedent, volition, and the consequent, muscular contraction : 

 volition is therefore known to us as an efficient cause of one 

 kind of actions ; and hence we must infer that it is the sole 

 efficient cause of all kinds of actions. Matter is absolutely 

 inert : it is inconceivable that matter should act upon matter, 

 but it is conceivable that mind should act upon matter; and 

 therefore all phenomena which are not the direct results 

 of human or animal will, are the direct results of divine will. 

 Such is the so-called Volitional Theory of Causation. 



With the theistic implications of this doctrine I shall deal 

 in a future chapter. At present we are concerned only with 

 its psychological basis. And first we may observe that those 

 who assert the action of mind upon matter to be conceivable, 

 appear to have forgotten the great difficulty under which 

 metaphysics laboured during the seventeenth century. To 

 Leibnitz and the Cartesians the action of mind upon matter 

 was the thing inconceivable above all others, to account for 

 which two theories were framed, among the most remarkable 

 in the annals of metaphysics. These are, the doctrine of 

 Occasional Causes, expounded by the Cartesian Malebranche, 

 and the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony, expounded by 

 Leibnitz, who is said to have plagiarized it from Spinoza. 

 The Cartesians held it to be inconceivable, and therefore (on 

 the subjective method) impossible, that thoughts or feelings 

 in the mind should produce movements in the body; and 

 consequently they regarded the concurrence of mental and 

 material facts " as mere Occasions on which the real agent, 

 God, thought fit to exert his power as a Cause." So that, 

 when you will to raise your arm, God interposes and lifts the 

 arm for you ; and he does this, not as a Being endowed with 

 volition, but as an omnipotent Being, capable of working a 

 miracle. To Leibnitz this seemed an unworthy view of 

 divine action. He preferred to regard the entire series of 



