ch. vi.] CAUSATION. 159 



volitions and the entire series of apparently consequent mus- 

 cular motions as independent series, pre-established in har- 

 mony with each other by the contrivance of the Deity from 

 a time preceding the commencement of the world. So that, 

 when you will to raise your arm, the arm moves, because God 

 in the past eternity constructed the series of your volitions 

 and the series of your motions like two clocks which accu- 

 rately correspond to each other in their rates of ticking. 



Such theories as these can, of course, be neither proved nor 

 disproved. They are cited as interesting specimens of the 

 manner in which human speculation attempts to grapple 

 with realities which lie beyond its reach ; but, as being un- 

 verifiable, our philosophy cannot recognize them as legiti- 

 mate hypotheses. Coupling them with the Volitional Theory, 

 the result is mutual destruction. In point of fact, we are no 

 more directly cognizant of the action of mind upon matter 

 than we are directly cognizant of the action of matter upon 

 matter. " Our will causes our bodily actions in the same 

 sense (and in no other) in which cold causes ice, or a spark 

 causes an explosion of gunpowder." The antecedent, volition, 

 and the subsequent, muscular movement, are subjects of con- 

 sciousness. But the relation of invariable sequence between 

 them is known by experience, just as we know any other 

 relation of sequence. As Mr. Mill observes, it cannot be 

 admitted "that our consciousness of the volition contains in 

 itself any d priori knowledge that the muscular motion will 

 follow. If our nerves of motion were paralyzed, or our 

 muscles stiff and inflexible, and had been so all our lives, 

 there is no ground for supposing that we should ever (unless 

 by information from other people) have known anything of 

 volition as a physical power, or been conscious of any 

 tendency in feelings of our mind to produce motions of our 

 body, or of other bodies." 1 In such case we might still 

 have had a sensation, like that which we now term the 



1 System of Logic, 6th edit. vol. i. p. 391. 



