CHAPTER VIZ 



ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND COSMISM. 



The "body of philosophic truth contained in the six fore- 

 going chapters can in nowise claim Auguste Comte as its 

 originator. The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge has, 

 as we have seen, been accepted more or less unreservedly by 

 most of the thinkers of the last two centuries ; and has, 

 indeed, never been- wholly lost sight of in philosophic specula- 

 tion since the time of Protagoras. Nevertheless the doctrine 

 has been variously interpreted by different philosophers ; 

 anl we have seen that the Positivist interpretation of it, 

 propounded by Littre' and Mill, is essentially different from 

 the interpretation given by Mr. Spencer, and here adopted. 

 Again, the doctrine that all knowledge is the product of the 

 intercourse between the sentient organism and its environ- 

 ment is a doctrine which has been held by more than half 

 the philosophic world since the time of Locke. The doctrine 

 that causation, as cognizable by us, is merely unconditional 

 invariable sequence was the doctrine of Hume, Brown, and 

 James Mill ; and for its further defence and elucidation we 

 are indebted, not to Comte, but to John Stuart Mil]. The 

 test of truth, as stated in the third chapter of this work, wa3 

 just as much or just as little postulated by Comte as by 

 preceding thinkers : it was first definitely propounded by Mr. 

 Spencer, and its validity has been repeatedly challenged by 



