ch. vii.] ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND COSMISM. 167 



no more question than as to its originality. It constituted 

 a revolution in philosophy as thorough and wide-reaching as 

 the revolution which Cuvier, by fusing together the studies 

 of comparative anatomy and palaeontology, brought about in 

 biology. In working out the details of his conception, 

 Comte, like Cuvier, fell into many grave errors : but the 

 great thing was, to have framed the conception. As Mr. 

 Spencer wisely and wittily observes, "Inquiring into the 

 pedigree of an idea is not a bad means of estimating its 

 value." Comte's conception of the evolution of philosophy 

 obliges us henceforth to test ideas by their pedigree, — to 

 trace their origin in the employment of the subjective or of 

 the objective method. Surely it was no small achievement 

 to bring together the truths which Locke and Hume and 

 others had laboriously detected, and to exhibit them as the 

 necessary outcome of twenty-five centuries of speculative 

 activity. For by this proceeding the truths in question were 

 at least historically justified. And although the psycho- 

 logical justification of thein had to be left for Mr. Spencer, 

 although it can be amply proved that Comte, in his ignorance 

 of psychology, seriously misinterpreted the import of these 

 truths, that is no reason why we should hesitate to acknow- 

 ledge the greatness of his achievement. The doctrine of 

 which Cuvier was the most eminent upholder — the doctrine 

 of fixity of species — is one which modern biology rejects, 

 j'ust as modern philosophy rejects the doctrines especially 

 characteristic of Comte's system. Nevertheless, as we admit 

 of Cuvier, that his innovation, in studying all existing 

 organisms with reference to past organisms, amounted to a 

 revolution in the attitude of biology ; so we must admit of 

 Comte, that his innovation, in studying all phases of thought 

 with reference to preceding phases of thought, amounted to 

 a revolution in the attitude of philosophy. Yet the latter 

 admission no more makes us followers of Comte than the 

 former admission makes us followers of Cuvier. 



