eH. viii.] ORGANIZATION OF THE SCIENCES 233 



fact that he repudiated the Copernican astronomy and refused 

 to profit by the physical discoveries of Gilbert. 



But the allusion to the Logic of Science may here serve to 

 remind us that, before we can thoroughly understand Comte's 

 general concaption of philosophy, there is another point of 

 view from which his system of the sciences must be 

 criticized; a point of view too little dwelt upon by Mr. 

 Spencer, since by the due consideration of it we shall arrive 

 at the deepest of the differences between the Comtean 

 organization of the sciences and the Spencerian organization 

 widoh is here adopted. In order fairly to bring out this 

 point, let us devote a chapter to considering the masterly 

 enumeration of scientific methods, and the survey of the 

 resources which the mind has at its disposal for the in- 

 vestigation of phenomena, which Comte has made a part of 

 his general philosophy of the sciences; withholding, until 

 the sequel, the application which is to be made of the 

 discussion. 



