ch. x.] COSMISM AND POSITIVISM. 261 



study of which tends in one sense to dwarf our conceptions 

 of Humanity. Comte was indeed too much of an astronomer 

 to retreat upon the Ptolemaic theory, but in his later works he 

 shows symptoms of a feeling like that which actuated Hegel, 

 when he openly regretted the overthrow of the ancient astro- 

 nomy, because it was more dignified for man to occupy the 

 centre of the universe ! It is true that, in his first great 

 work, Comte points out the absurdity of the theological view 

 of man's supremacy in the universe, and rightly ascribes to 

 the Copernican revolution a considerable share in the over- 

 throwing of this view, and of the doctrine of final causes, 

 with which it is linked. In spite of all this, however, and 

 in spite of his admirable scientific preparation, Comte's con- 

 ception of philosophy as the summary of a hierarchy of 

 sciences, presided over by sociology, led him irresistibly 

 toward the anthropocentric point of view; and so, when it 

 became necessary for him to crown his work by indicating 

 its relations to religion, he arrived, logically enough, at a 

 Religion of Humanity, although in order to reach such a 

 terminus he was obliged to throw his original Positivism 

 overboard and follow the subjective method. In view then 

 of all this complicated difference between the Positivist con- 

 ception of philosophy and the conception expounded in this 

 work, I think we are quite justified in designating our own 

 conception by a different and characteristic name. 



But the most fatal and irreconcilable divergence appears 

 when we come to consider the third cardinal proposition, — 

 that which relates to deanthropomorphization. If we inquire 

 how it was that Comte was enabled to perpetrate, in the 

 name of philosophy, such a prodigious piece of absurdity as 

 the deification of Humanity, we shall find the explanation to 

 lie in his misconception of what is meant by the relativity 

 of knowledge. A good illustration of his confused thinking 

 on this subject, to which I have already had occasion to 

 efer, is afforded by his treatment of atheism. Comte had 



