272 COSMIC riTILOSOPIIY. vr. l 



such a Synthesis to stand for the whole of attainable philo- 

 sophy were partly based ? 



I state this dilemma as strongly as possible, because it 

 forcibly illustrates the omnipresence of Mystery, — because it 

 shows how, beneath every physical problem, there lies a 

 metaphysical problem whereof no human cunning can detect 

 the solution. Practically, however, the avenue of escape has 

 sometime since been implicitly indicated, — in the fifth and 

 sixth chapters of these Prolegomena. In the chapter on 

 Causation it was shown that, though we can in nowise 

 conceive matter as acting upon matter, yet, for the purposes 

 of common-sense, of science and of philosophy, it is quite 

 enough that one kind of phenomenal manifestation is in- 

 variably and unconditionally succeeded by some other kind 

 of phenomenal manifestation. And in characterizing the 

 Subjective and Objective Methods, we saw that the truth of 

 any proposition, for scientific purposes, is determined by its 

 agreement with observed phenomena, and not by its con- 

 gruity with some assumed metaphysical basis. For example, 

 the entire Newtonian astronomy — the most elaborate and 

 finished scientific achievement of the human mind — rests upon 

 a hypothesis which, if metaphysically interpreted, is simply 

 inconceivable. The conception of matter attracting matter 

 through an intervening tract of emptiness is a conception 

 which it is impossible to frame, — and Newton knew it, or 

 felt it to be so. But nowhere did his unrivalled wisdom 

 show itself more impressively than in this, — that he accu- 

 rately discriminated between the requirements of science 

 and the requirements of metaphysics, and clearly saw that, 

 while metaphysics is satisfied with nothing short of absolute 

 subjective congruity, it is quite enough for a scientific hypo- 

 thesis that it gives a correct description of the observed 

 coexistences and sequences among phenomena. 1 In truth, 



1 This is distinctly stated by Copernicus : " Neque enim necesse est eas 

 hypotheses esse veras, imo ne verisimile quidem, sed sufficit hoc iinum, si 



