74 COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. [pt. u. 



not be fair in us to draw the inference for him and then 

 upbraid him with it. This kind of misrepresentation is dear 

 to theologians, and we may contentedly leave them an entire 

 monopoly of it. But worse remains behind. Having con- 

 demned psychological analj^sis as useless, Comte offers us in 

 exchange the ludicrous substitute — Phrenology ! 



Of all the scientific blunders which Comte ever made, this 

 •was beyond question the one which has done most to injure 

 his credit with competent scientific critics. Yet in fairness 

 we must remember that Comte's ignorance of psychology was 

 his weakest point, and that forty years ago, when the anatomy 

 and phj'siology of the nervous system were in their infancy 

 the conception of dividing the grey surface of the cerebrum 

 into thirty or more provinces, each the seat of a complex 

 group of mental aptitudes, did not seem so absurd as it does 

 now. In those days even Broussais, a first-class physiologist, 

 adopted some of the leading doctrines of phrenology. More- 

 over the fundamental conception of Gall — which included 

 the anatomical comparison of all animal brains, in con- 

 nection with the study of the mental cliaracteristics of 

 animals — was a noble conception ; though in working it out 

 he showed himself lamentably ignorant of the plainest rules 

 of induction. The purposes of our inquiry do not render it 

 necessary for me to discuss the merits of a hypothesis which 

 has long since ceased to be of any interest, save as an episode 

 in the early history of physiological psychology. Those who 

 wish to see the question treated critically may be referred to 

 the works of Miiller, Valentin, "Wagner, Vulpian, Gratiolet, 

 Longet, and especially of Lelut ; to the appendix to Hamil- 

 ton's " Lectures on Metaphysics " ; to the chapter on Gall in 

 ]\[r. Lewes's "History of Philosophy"; and to Mr. Bain's 

 treatise on "The Study of Character." 



It is not Comte's acceptance of phrenology, but his denial 

 of psychology, which here concerns us. The former is merely 

 a personal question, bearing upon Comte's scientific com- 



