CH. XIV.] LIFE AND MIND. 81 



recollecting the topics which occupied us in the first part of 

 this work. Psychology is therefore distinct alike from biology 

 and from other sciences, in its problems and in its theorems. 

 The problem of bioloyy is to formulate the laws of nutri- 

 tion and reproduction, muscular contraction and nervous 

 iriitation, heredity and adaptation. The problem of psy- 

 chology is to forraalate the laws of Association, — the order 

 in which certain relations among environing phenomena give 

 rise to certain corresponding relations among our states of 

 consciousness. And while the theorems of objective science 

 in general are based upon the observation of objective phe- 

 nomena, whether external or internal to the organism; the 

 theorems of psychology are based not only upon the obser- 

 vation of objective phenomena, but also upon the observation 

 of subjective states. 



In view of these results, we see how hopelessly Comte 

 went astray. Kejecting all introspection as metaphysical 

 and delusive, he would have had us confine our inquiries to 

 the succession of those nervous phenomena which are the 

 invariable concomitants of feelings, ignoring the fact that 

 without introspective observation we can never even ascertain 

 that there is any invariable concomitance between the feel- 

 Vngs and the nervous phenomena. He would have us solve 

 ik problem in which two factors are concerned, by investi- 

 gating only one factor. 



In giving his reasons for thus rejecting all observation of 

 consciousness, Comte reveals his inability (upon which I 

 have already frequently remarked) to distinguish between 

 psychology and metaphysics. He insists that psychologic 

 inquiry, as hitherto conducted, has not resulted in discovery. 

 If this were true, it would not help his case. Metaphysical 

 psychologists have failed in discovery, not because they have 

 directly examined states of consciousness, but because they 

 have constructed unvcrifiablc hypotheses about the nature of 

 Mind in itself^ Where they have abstained from ontological 



VOL. II. G 



