174 CUSAIIC PEILOSOFHY. [pt. it. 



completely solved. But in reality all tliis perplexity is the 

 result of the desperate muddle into which metaphysics has 

 brought the subject. Strip the question of the peculiar meta- 

 physical jargon in which it is usually propounded, restate it 

 in precise scientific lanc^uage, and it becomes a very easy 

 question to answer. Would that science presented none 

 more difficult ! Confused and inaccurate verbiage is respon- 

 sible for the chronic disputation upon this subject. No- 

 where else is Berkeley's complaint so thoroughly applicable, 

 that in dealing with metaphysics men first kick up a dust 

 and then wonder why they cannot see through it. Those 

 who have come to regard the question from a purely scientific 

 point of view, also regard it as thoroughly settled ; and the 

 need for refuting such arguments as the one above cited, they 

 class among the needs, too often thrust upon us, of refuting 

 fallacies already thrice exploded. In illustration of this, let 

 us notice the theory which the free-will argument implies 

 concerning the nature of volition. 



The theory implies that over and above particular acts of 

 volition, there is a certain entity called " The Will," which 

 is itself a sort of personage within the human personality. 

 This entity, called " The Will," is supposed to have desires 

 and intentions of its own, which the causationists are sup- 

 posed to declare constantly liable to be frustrated by external 

 agencies. In opposition to this imaginary heresy, it is 

 asserted that this autocratic Will is " free," and sitting in 

 judgment over *' motives," may set aside the stronger in 

 favour of a weaker, or may issue a decree in defiance of aU 

 motives alike. Some such crude conception as this is im- 

 plicitly conveyed by every statement which, alluding to the 

 Will as an entity, ascribes "freedom" to it. Only by means 

 of such a conception can the phrase " freedom of the Will " 

 be shielded from the imputation of nonsense. Only thus 

 can the argument above cited be regarded as relevant to the 

 subject in dispute. For if Will be not conceived as an 



