NATURAL THEOLOGY. 73 



nature, from this solution, which no one would ac- 

 cept as applied to a collection of machines. 



V. To the marks of contrivance discoverable in 

 animal bodies, and to the argument deduced from 

 them in proof of design and of a designing Creator, 

 this turn is sometimes attempted to be given, name- 

 ly, that the parts were not intended for the use, but 

 that the use arose out of the parts. This distinc- 

 tion is intelligible. A cabinet-maker rubs his ma- 

 hogony with fish-skin ; yet it would be too much to 

 assert that the skin of the dog-fish was made rough 

 and granulated on purpose for the polishing of wood, 

 and the use of cabinet-makers. Therefore the dis- 

 tinction is intelligible. But I think that there is 

 very little place for it in the works of nature. When 

 roundly and generally affirmed of them, as it hath 

 sometimes been, it amounts to such another stretch 

 of assertion as it would be to say, that all the im- 

 plements of the cabinet-maker's workshop, as well 

 as his fish-skin, were substances accidentally con- 

 figurated, which he had picked up and converted 

 to his use ; that his adzes, saws, planes, and gimlets, 

 were not made, as we suppose, to hew, cut, smooth, 

 shape out, or bore wood with ; but that, these things 

 being made, no matter with what design, or whether 

 with any, the cabinet-maker perceived that they 

 were applicable to his purpose, and turned them 

 to account. 



But, again. So far as this solution is attempted 

 to be applied to those parts of animals the action 

 of which does not depend upon the will of the ani- 



7 



