330 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 



attraction of the calf or lamb to the teat of the 

 dam, is not explained by simply referring it to the 

 sense of smell. What made the scent of milk so 

 agreeable to the lamb that it should follow it up 

 with its nose, or seek with its mouth the place 

 from which it proceeded ? No observation, no 

 experience, no argument could teach the new- 

 dropped animal that the substance from w^iich 

 the scent issued was the material of its food. It 

 had never tasted milk before its birth. None 

 of the animals which are not designed for that 

 nourishment ever offer to suck, or to seek out any 

 such food. What is the conclusion, but that the 

 sugescent parts of animals are fitted for their use, 

 and the knowledge of that use put into them? 



We assert, secondly, that, even as to the cases 

 in which the hypothesis has the fairest claim to 

 consideration, it does not at all lessen the force 

 of the argument for intention and design. The 

 doctrine of instinct is that of appetencies, super- 

 added to the constitution of an animal, for the 

 effectuating of a purpose beneficial to the species. 

 The above-stated solution would derive these ap- 

 petencies from organization; but then this organi- 

 zation is not less specifically, not less precisely, 

 and, therefore, not less evidently adapted to the 

 same ends, than the appetencies themselves would 

 be upon the old hypothesis. In this way of con- 

 sidering the subject, sensation supplies the place 

 of foresight : but this is the effect of contrivance 

 on the part of the Creator. Let it be allowed, 



