NATURAL THEOLOGY. 55 



experience, no single instance or example, can be 

 offered in favour of any other. In this cause, 

 therefore, we ought to rest : in this cause, the 

 common sense of mankind has, in fact, rested, be- 

 cause it agrees with that, which, in all cases, is the 

 foundation of knowledge, — the undeviating course 

 of their experience. The reasoning is the same 

 as that, by which we conclude any ancient ap- 

 pearances to have been the effects of volcanoes 

 or inundations ; namely, because they resemble 

 the effects which fire and water produce before 

 our eyes ; and because we have never known 

 these efiects to result from any other operation. 

 And this resemblance may subsist in so many 

 circumstances, as not to leave us under the small- 

 est doubt in forming our opinion. Men are not 

 deceived by this reasoning : for whenever it hap- 

 pens, as it sometimes does happen, that the truth 

 comes to be known by direct information, it turns 

 out to be what was expected. In like manner, 

 and upon the same foundation, (which in truth is 

 that of experience,) we conclude that the works of 

 nature proceed from intelHgence and design; be- 

 cause, in the properties of relation to a purpose, 

 subserviency to a use, they resemble what intelH- 

 gence and design are constantly producing, and 

 what nothing except intelligence and design ever 

 produce at all. Of every argument, which would 

 raise a question as to the safety of this reasoning, 

 it may be observed, that if such argument be 

 listened to, it leads to the inference, not only that 



