NATURAL THEOLOGY. 105 



I crave leave to transcribe into this place what 

 I have said upon this subject in my Moral Philo- 

 sophy : — 



" When God created the human species, either 

 he v^ished their happiness, or he wished their mi^. 

 sery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about 

 either. 



" If he had wished our misery, he might have 

 made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses 

 to be so many sores and pains to us, as they are 

 now instruments of gratification and enjoyment ; 

 or by placing us amidst objects so ill suited to our 

 perceptions, as to have continually offended us, 

 instead of ministering to our refreshment and de- 

 light. He might have made, for example, every 

 thing we tasted, bitter ; every thing we saw, loath- 

 some ; every thing we touched, a sting ; every 

 smell a stench ; and every sound, a discord. 



"If he had been indifferent about our happiness 

 or misery, we must impute to our good fortune 

 (as all design by this supposition is excluded,) 

 both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, 



accounted evils are less bad than they seem to be. He explains 

 the deductions which are fairly to be made ; he shows the com- 

 pensations which exist ; he proves that out of evil good frequent- 

 ly arises. Having done this, evil still remains, but in an amount 

 exceedingly reduced ; and this remaining portion is that concern- 

 ing which alone the question arises. All that follows of text 

 must read with this view ; and it must be admitted that nothing 

 can be more legitimate than the scope of the reasoning employed 

 if regarded in this light. Viewed in any other, it would be liable 

 to the objections which have been urged against it. 



