120 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 



This proposition may be thus explained : The 

 capacities, which, according to the established 

 course of nature, are necessary to the support or 

 preservation of an animal, however manifestly 

 they may be the result of an organization con- 

 trived for the purpose, can only be deemed an act 

 or a pait of the same will, as that which decreed 

 the existence of the animal itself ; because, whe- 

 ther the creation proceeded from a benevolent or 

 a malevolent being, these capacities must have 

 been given, if the animal existed at all. Animal 

 properties, therefore, which fall under this descrip- 

 tion, do not strictly prove the goodness of God ; 

 they may prove the existence of the Deity ; they 

 may prove a high degree of power and intelli- 

 gence : but they do not prove his goodness ; for 

 asmuch as they must have been found in any crea- 

 tion which was capable of continuance, although 

 it is possible to suppose, that such a creation might 

 have been produced by a being whose views rest- 

 ed upon misery. 



But there is a class of properties, which may 



there is more inducement employed, more pleasure superadded, 

 than is even necessary to work the effect intended. It is as if 

 a human lawgiver were to prefer rewarding his subjects for obe- 

 dience, rather than punishing them for contumacy ; and were then 

 to add some bounty beyond what had been found quite sufficient 

 to ensure their compliance. It must be constantly borne in mind, 

 that there is not one single act performed by any animal, from 

 man to the lowest insect in the scale, in fulfilling tlio apparent 

 ends of its creation, the performance of which mii;lit not have 

 been secured as effectually by the pressure or by the apprehen- 

 sion of pain, as it now is, in so vast a number of instances, soli- 

 cited by the enjoyment or the hope of some gratification. 



