NATURAL THEOLOGY. 121 



be said to be superadded from an intention ex- 

 pressly directed to happiness ; an intention to give 

 a happy existence distinct from the general inten- 

 tion of providing the means of existence ; and that 

 is, of capacities for pleasure, in cases wherein, so 

 far as the conservation of the individual or of the 

 species is concerned, they were not wanted, or 

 wherein the purpose might have been secured by 

 the operation of pain. The provision which is 

 made of a variety of objects, not necessary to life, 

 and ministering only to our pleasures ; and the pro- 

 perties given to the necessaries of life themselves, 

 by which they contribute to pleasure as well as 

 preservation ; show a further design than that of 

 giving existence.* 



A single instance will make all this clear. As- 

 suming the necessity of food for the support of 

 animal life, it is requisite that the animal be pro- 

 vided with organs fitted for the procuring, receiv- 

 ing, and digesting of its food. It may also be ne- 

 cessary, that the animal be impelled by its sensa- 

 tions to exert its organs. But the pain of hunger 

 would do all this. Why add pleasure to the act 

 of eating ; sweetness and relish to food ? why a 

 new and appropriate sense for the perception of 

 the pleasure? Why should the juice of a peach 



* See this topic considered in Dr. Balguy's Treatise upon the 

 Divine Benevolence. This excellent author first, I think, pro- 

 posed it; and nearly in the terms in which it is here stated. Some 

 other observations also under this head are taken from that treatise 

 — J^ote of the JliU'ior. 



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