NATURAL THEOLOGY. 129 



mind what our two propositions were. They 

 were, firstly, that in a vast plurality of instances, 

 in which contrivance is perceived, the design of 

 the contrivance is beneficial : secondly, that the 

 Deity has added pleasure to animal sensations be- 

 yond what was necessary for any other purpose ; 

 or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary, 

 might have been effected by the operation of pain. 

 Whilst these propositions can be maintained, 

 we are authorized to ascribe to the Deity the cha- 

 racter of benevolence ; and what is benevolence 

 at all, must in him be infinite benevolence, by 

 reason of the infinite, that is to say, the incalcula- 

 bly great, number of objects upon which it is 

 exercised. 



Of the ORIGIN OF EVIL HO Universal solution has 

 been discovered ; I mean, no solution which 

 reaches to all cases of complaint. The most compre- 

 hensive is that which arises from the considera- 

 tion o^ general rules?^ We may, I think, without 



*' These observations on General Laws, and those which fol- 

 low upon the doctrine of Imperfections, have been misunderstood, 

 in the same way with the former remarks, referred to in the second 

 note upon this chapter ; but it must be allowed that the expres- 

 sions here used respecting General Laws are somewhat incau- 

 tious, and more liable to cavil. Nevertheless, the whole scope of 

 the argument which follows plainly shows that our author never 

 thought of solving the difficulty as to evil by resorting to the exist- 

 ence of laws, which are themselves only the modes of acting 

 pursued by the Deity himself In truth this portion of his argu- 

 ment is, like that gn which we formerly commented, only to ba 



