NATURAL THEOLOGY. 131 



without incurring greater evils than those which 

 would be avoided. The consideration, therefore, 

 of general laws, although it may concern the ques- 

 tion of the origin of evil very nearly, (which I think 

 it does,) rests in views disproportionate to our fa- 

 culties, and in a knowledge which we do not pos- 

 sess. It serves rather to account for the obscurity 

 of the subject, than to supply us with distinct an- 

 swers to our difficulties. However, whilst we as- 

 sent to the above-stated propositions, as principles, 

 whatever uncertainty we may find in the applica- 

 tion, we lay a ground for believing, that cases of 

 apparent evil, for which we can suggest no particu- 

 lar reason, are governed by reasons, which are 

 more general, which lie deeper in the order of 

 second causes, and which on that account are re- 

 moved to a greater distance from us. 



The doctrine of imperfections, or, as it is called, 

 of evils of imperfection, furnishes an account, 

 founded, like the former, in views of universal na- 

 ture. The doctrine is briefly this : — It is proba- 

 ble, that creation may be better replenished by 

 sensitive beings of different sorts, than by sensitive 

 beings all of one sort. It is likewise probable, that 

 it may be better replenished by different orders 

 of beings rising one above another in gradation, 

 than by beings possessed of equal degrees of per- 

 fection. Now, a gradation of such beings implies 

 a gradation of imperfections. No class can justly 

 complain of the imperfections which belong to its 

 place in the scale, unless it were allowable for it 



