NATURAL THEOLOGY. 167 



government, could not be prevented or alleviated, 

 that is to say, could not be remitted in whole or 

 in part, except by the authority w^hich inflicted 

 them, or by an appellate or superior authority. 

 This consideration, which is founded in our most 

 acknowledged apprehensions of the nature of penal 

 justice, may possess its weight in the Divine coun- 

 sels. Virtue perhaps is the greatest of all ends. 

 In human beings, relative virtues form a large 

 part of the whole. Now relative virtue presup- 

 poses, not only the existence of evil, without 

 which it could have no object, no material to work 

 upon, but that evils be apparently, at least, mis- 

 fortunes ; that is, the effects of apparent chance. 

 It may be in pursuance, therefore, and in further- 

 ance of the same scheme of probation, that the 

 evils of life are made so to present themselves. 



I have already observed, that when we let in 

 religious considerations we often let in light upon 

 the difficulties of nature. So in the fact now to 

 be accounted for, the degree of happiness which 

 we usually enjoy in this life may be better suited 

 to a state of trial and probation than a greater 

 degree would be. The truth is, we are rather 

 too much delighted with the world than too little. 

 Imperfect, broken, and precarious as our plea- 

 sures are, they are more than sufficient to attach 

 us to the eager pursuit of them. A regard to a 

 future state can hardly keep its place as it is. If 

 we were designed therefore to be influenced by 

 that regard, might not a more indulgent system. 



