10 NATURE AND DESIGN OF THIS WORK. [CHAP. I. 



so on, I say that these are general questions, which it should 

 fall within the scope or province of a general method in Logic to 

 solve. Perhaps we might include them all under this one state- 

 ment of the final problem of practical Logic. Given a set of 

 premises expressing relations among certain elements, whether 

 things or propositions : required explicitly the whole relation 

 consequent among any of those elements under any proposed 

 conditions, and in any proposed form. That this problem, under 

 all its aspects, is resolvable, will hereafter appear. But it is not 

 for the sake of noticing this fact, that the above inquiry into the 

 nature and the functions of a general method in Logic has been 

 introduced. It is necessary that the reader should apprehend 

 what are the specific ends of the investigation upon which we 

 are entering, as well as the principles which are to guide us to 

 the attainment of them. 



9. Possibly it may here be said that the Logic of Aristotle, 

 in its rules of syllogism and conversion, sets forth the elementary 

 processes of which all reasoning consists, and that beyond these 

 there is neither scope nor occasion for a general method. I have 

 no desire to point out the defects of the common Logic, nor do I 

 wish to refer to it any further than is necessary, in order to place 

 in its true light the nature of the present treatise. With this 

 end alone in view, I would remark : 1st. That syllogism, con- 

 version, &c., are not the ultimate processes of Logic. It will 

 be shown in this treatise that they are founded upon, and are re- 

 solvable into, ulterior and more simple processes which constitute 

 the real elements of method in Logic. Nor is it true in fact that 

 all inference is reducible to the particular forms of syllogism and 

 conversion. Vide Chap. xv. 2ndly. If all inference were re- 

 ducible to these two processes (and it has been maintained that 

 it is reducible to syllogism alone), there would still exist the 

 same necessity for a general method. For it would still be re- 

 quisite to determine in what order the processes should succeed 

 each other, as well as their particular nature, in order that the 

 desired relation should be obtained. By the desired relation I 

 mean that full relation which, in virtue of the premises, connects 

 any elements selected out of the premises at will, and which, 

 moreover, expresses that relation in any desired form and order. 



