CHAP. III.] DERIVATION OF THE LAWS. 43 



us to select mentally from that Universe all the beings to which 

 the term "men" is applicable ; so the adjective "good," in the 

 combination " good men," directs us still further to select men- 

 tally from the class of men all those who possess the further 

 quality "good;" and if another adjective were prefixed to the 

 combination " good men," it would direct a further operation of 

 the same nature, having reference to that further quality which 

 it might be chosen to express. 



It is important to notice carefully the real nature of the ope- 

 ration here described, for it is conceivable, that it might have 

 been different from what it is. Were the adjective simply attri- 

 butive in its character, it would seem, that when a particular set 

 of beings is designated by men, the prefixing of the adjective 

 good would direct us to attach mentally to all those beings the 

 quality of goodness. But this is not the real office of the ad- 

 jective. The operation which we really perform is one of se- 

 lection according to a prescribed principle or idea. To what fa- 

 culties of the mind such an operation would be referred, according 

 to the received classification of its powers, it is not important to 

 inquire, but I suppose that it would be considered as dependent 

 upon the two faculties of Conception or Imagination, and Atten- 

 tion. To the one of these faculties might be referred the forma- 

 tion of the general conception ; to the other the fixing- of the 

 mental regard upon those individuals within the prescribed uni- 

 verse of discourse which answer to the conception. If, however, 

 as seems not improbable, the power of Attention is nothing more 

 than the power of continuing the exercise of any other faculty of the 

 mind, we might properly regard the whole of the mental process 

 above described as referrible to the mental faculty of Imagination 

 or Conception, the first step of the process being the conception 

 of the Universe itself, and each succeeding step limiting in a de- 

 finite manner the conception thus formed. Adopting this view, I 

 shall describe each such step, or any definite combination of such 

 steps, as a definite act of conception. And the use of this term I 

 shall extend so as to include in its meaning nottmly the conception 

 of classes of objects represented by particular names or simple 

 attributes of quality, but also the combination of such concep- 

 tions in any manner consistent with the powers and limitations 



