44 DERIVATION OF THE LAWS. [CHAP. III. 



of the human mind ; indeed, any intellectual operation short 

 of that which is involved in the structure of a sentence or propo- 

 sition. The general laws to which such operations of the mind 

 are subject are now to be considered. 



7. Now it will be shown that the laws which in the preced- 

 ing chapter have been determined a posteriori from the consti- 

 tution of language, for the use of the literal symbols of Logic, 

 are in reality the laws of that definite mental operation which 

 has just been described. We commence our discourse with a 

 certain understanding as to the limits of its subject, i. e. as to 

 the limits of its Universe. Every name, every term of descrip- 

 tion that we employ, directs him whom we address to the per- 

 formance of a certain mental operation upon that subject. And 

 thus is thought communicated. But as each name or descriptive 

 term is in this view but the representative of an intellectual ope- 

 ration, that operation being also prior in the order of nature, it 

 is clear that the laws of the name or symbol must be of a deriva- 

 tive character, must, in fact, originate in those of the operation 

 which they represent. That the laws of the symbol and of the 

 mental process are identical in expression will now be shown. 



8. Let us then suppose that the universe of our discourse is 

 the actual universe, so that words are to be used in the full ex- 

 tent of their meaning, and let us consider the two mental opera- 

 tions implied by the words " white" and " men." The word 

 " men" implies the operation of selecting in thought from its 

 subject, the universe, all men; and the resulting conception, 

 men, becomes the subject of the next operation. The operation 

 implied by the word " white" is that of selecting from its subject, 

 "men," all of that class which are white. The final resulting 

 conception is that of " white men." Now it is perfectly appa- 

 rent that if the operations above described had been performed 

 in a converse order, the result would have been the same. Whe- 

 ther we begin by forming the conception of " men," and then 

 by a second intellectual act limit that conception to " white 

 men," or whether we begin by forming the conception of " white 

 objects," and then limit it to such of that class as are "men," is 

 perfectly indifferent so far as the result is concerned. It is ob- 

 vious that the order of the mental processes would be equally 



