134 % METHODS OF ABBREVIATION. [CHAP. IX. 



tain condition of mind in him who performs them, viz., that he 

 perform them knowingly, and with deliberate preference, and for 

 their own sakes, and upon fixed principles of conduct, proceeds 

 in the two following chapters to consider the question, whether 

 virtue is to be referred to the genus of Passions, or Faculties, or 

 Habits, together with some other connected points. He grounds 

 his investigation upon the following premises, from which, also, 

 he deduces the general doctrine and definition of moral virtue, of 

 which the remainder of the treatise forms an exposition. 



PREMISES. 



1. Virtue is either a passion ("jrdOog), or a faculty (Suva/a?), 

 or a habit (!c) 



2. Passions are not things according to which we are praised 

 or blamed, or in which we exercise deliberate preference. 



3. Faculties are not things according to which we are praised 

 or blamed, and which are accompanied by deliberate preference. 



4. Virtue is something according to which we are praised 

 or blamed, and which is accompanied by deliberate preference. . 



5. Whatever art or science makes its work to be in a good 

 state avoids extremes, and keeps the mean in view relative to 

 human nature (TO JU&TOV . . . TTJOOC i?juac). 



6. Virtue is more exact and excellent than any art or science. 

 This is an argument a fortiori. If science and true art shun 



defect and extravagance alike, much more does virtue pursue the 

 undeviating line of moderation. If they cause their work to be 

 in a good state, much more reason have to we to say that Virtue 

 causeth her peculiar work to be " in a good state." Let the 

 final premiss be thus interpreted. Let us also pretermit all re- 

 ference to praise or blame, since the mention of these in the pre- 

 mises accompanies only the mention of deliberate preference, and 

 this is an element which we purpose to retain. We may then 

 assume as our representative symbols 



v = virtue. 



p passions. 



f = faculties. 



h = habits. 



d = things accompanied by deliberate preference. 



