CHAP. XI.] OF SECONDARY PROPOSITIONS. 163 



also as things, and refer them, by analogy with the previous 

 case, to a universe of their own? Again, the relations among 

 these subject propositions are relations of coexistent truth or 

 falsehood, not of substantive equivalence. We do not say, when 

 expressing the connexion of two distinct propositions, that the 

 one is the other, but use some such forms of speech as the fol- 

 lowing, according to the meaning which we desire to convey : 

 "Either the proposition X is true, or the proposition Fis true ;" 

 " If the proposition X is true, the proposition Y is true ;" " The 

 propositions X and Fare jointly true ;" and so on. 



Now, in considering any such relations as the above, we are 

 not called upon to inquire into the whole extent of their possible 

 meaning (for this might involve us in metaphysical questions of 

 causation, which are beyond the proper limits of science) ; but it 

 suffices to ascertain some meaning which they undoubtedly pos- 

 sess, and which is adequate for the purposes of logical deduction. 

 Let us take, as an instance for examination, the conditional pro- 

 position, " If the proposition X is true, the proposition F is 

 true." An undoubted meaning of this proposition is, that the 

 time in which the proposition X is true, is time in which the pro- 

 position Fis true. This indeed is only a relation of coexistence, 

 and may or may not exhaust the meaning of the proposition, but 

 it is a relation really involved in the statement of the proposition, 

 and further, it suffices for all the purposes of logical inference. 



The language of common life sanctions this view of the es- 

 sential connexion of secondary propositions with the notion of 

 time. Thus we limit the application of a primary proposition by 

 the word " some," but that of a secondary proposition by the 

 word " sometimes." To say, " Sometimes injustice triumphs," 

 is equivalent to asserting that there are times in which the pro- 

 position " Injustice now triumphs," is a true proposition. There 

 are indeed propositions, the truth of which is not thus limited to 

 particular periods or conjunctures ; propositions which are true 

 throughout all time, and have received the appellation of " eter- 

 nal truths." The distinction must be familiar to every reader of 

 Plato and Aristotle, by the latter of whom, especially, it is em- 

 ployed to denote the contrast between the abstract verities of 

 science, such as the propositions of geometry which are always 



M 2 



