186 CLARKE AND SPINOZA. [CHAP. XIII. 



not in the application of the method to the premises once deter- 

 mined, but in ascertaining what the premises are. In what are 

 regarded as the most rigorous examples of reasoning applied to 

 metaphysical questions, it will occasionally be found that different 

 trains of thought are blended together; that particular but essen- 

 tial parts of the demonstration are given parenthetically, or out 

 of the main course of the argument; that the meaning of a pre- 

 miss may be in some degree ambiguous ; and, not unfrequently, 

 that arguments, viewed by the strict laws of formal reasoning, 

 are incorrect or inconclusive. The difficulty of determining and 

 distinctly exhibiting the true premises of a demonstration may, 

 in such cases, be very considerable. But it is a difficulty which 

 must be overcome by all who would ascertain whether a parti- 

 cular conclusion is proved or not, whatever form they may be 

 prepared or disposed to give to the ulterior process of reasoning. 

 It is a difficulty, therefore, which is not peculiar to the method 

 of this work, though it manifests itself more distinctly in con- 

 nexion with this method than with any other. So intimate, in- 

 deed, is this connexion, that it is impossible, employing the me- 

 thod of this treatise, to form even a conjecture as to the validity 

 of a conclusion, without a distinct apprehension and exact state- 

 ment of all the premises upon which it rests. In the more usual 

 course of procedure, nothing is, however, more common than to 

 examine some of the steps of a train of argument, and thence to 

 form a vague general impression of the scope of the whole, with- 

 out any such preliminary and thorough analysis of the premises 

 which it involves. 



The necessity of a rigorous determination of the real pre- 

 mises of a demonstration ought not to be regarded as an evil ; 

 especially as, when that task is accomplished, every source of 

 doubt or ambiguity is removed. In employing the method of 

 this treatise, the order in which premises are arranged, the mode 

 of connexion which they exhibit, with every similar circumstance, 

 may be esteemed a matter of indifference, and the process of 

 inference is conducted with a precision which might almost be 

 termed mechanical. 



3. The " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 

 God," consists of a series of propositions or theorems, each 



