CHAP. XIII.] CLARKE AND SPINOZA. 189 



of the hypothesis, that " the things that now are have risen out 

 of nothing." It is resolvable as follows : 



5th. If something is, either it exists by the necessity of its 

 own nature, or it exists by the will of another being. 



6th. If it exists by the necessity of its own nature, something 

 always was. 



7th. If it exists by the will of another being, then the pro- 

 position, that the things which exist have arisen out of nothing, 

 is false. 



The last proposition is not expressed in the same form in the 

 text of Dr. Clarke ; but his expressed conclusion of the prior ex- 

 istence of another Being is clearly meant as equivalent to a de- 

 nial of the proposition that the things which now are have risen 

 out of nothing. 



It appears, therefore, that the demonstration consists of two 

 distinct trains of argument : one of those trains comprising what 

 I have designated as the first and second parts of the demonstra- 

 tion ; the other comprising ihejirst and third parts. Let us con- 

 sider the latter train. 



The premises are : 



1st. Something is. 



2nd. If something is, either something always was, or the 

 things that now are have risen out of nothing. 



3rd. If something is, either it exists in the necessity of its 

 own nature, or it exists by the will of another being. 



4th. If it exists in the necessity of its own nature, something 

 always was. 



5th. If it exists by the will of another being, then the hy- 

 pothesis, that the things which now are have risen out of nothing, 

 is false. 



We must now express symbolically the above proposition. 



Let x = Something is. 



y = Something always was. 



z = The things which now are have risen from 



nothing. 

 p - It exists in the necessity of its own nature 



(i.e. the something spoken of above). 

 q - It exists by the will of another Being. 



