CHAP. XIII.] CLARKE AND SPINOZA. 201 



figure, divisibility, or any of the known properties of matter ; 

 for these are not perfections, but limitations. To this is added 

 the a posteriori argument from the manifestation of design in the 

 frame of the universe. 



There is appended, however, a distinct argument for the 

 existence of an intelligent self-existent being, founded upon the 

 phenomenal existence of motion in the universe. I shall briefly 

 exhibit this proof, and shall apply to it the method of the present 

 treatise. 



The argument, omitting unimportant explanations, is as fol- 

 lows : 



" 'Tis evident there is some such a thing as motion in the 

 world ; which either began at some time or other, or was eternal. 

 If it began in time, then the question is granted that the first 

 cause is an intelligent being. . . . On the contrary, if motion was 

 eternal, either it was eternally caused by some eternal intelligent 

 being, or it must of itself be necessary and self-existent, or else, 

 without any necessity in its own nature, and without any external 

 necessary cause, it must have existed from eternity by an endless 

 successive communication. If motion was eternally caused by 

 some eternal intelligent being, this also is granting the question 

 as to the present dispute. If it was of itself necessary and self- 

 existent, then it follows that it must be a contradiction in terms 

 to suppose any matter to be at rest. And yet, at the same time, 

 because the determination of this self-existent motion must be 

 every way at once, the effect of it would be nothing else but a 

 perpetual rest. . . . But if it be said that motion, without any ne- 

 cessity in its own nature, and without any external necessary 

 cause, has existed from eternity merely by an endless successive 

 communication, as Spinoza inconsistently enough seems to assert, 

 this I have before shown (in the proof of the second general 

 proposition of this discourse) to be a plain contradiction. It re- 

 mains, therefore, that motion must of necessity be originally 

 caused by something that is intelligent." 



The premises of the above argument may be thus disposed : 



1. If motion began in time, the first cause is an intelligent 

 being. 



