CHAP. XIII.] CLARKE AND SPINOZA. 205 



whence we have the interpretation, If motion has existed from 

 eternity, it has been eternally caused by an eternal intelligent being ; 

 together with the converse of that proposition. 



In Prop. ix. it is argued, that " the self-existent and original 

 cause of all things is not a necessary agent, but a being endued 

 with liberty and choice." The proof is based mainly upon his 

 possession of intelligence, and upon the existence of final causes, 

 implying design and choice. To the objection that the supreme 

 cause operates by necessity for the production of what is best, it 

 is replied, that this is a necessity of fitness and wisdom, and not 

 of nature. 



14. In Prop. x. it is argued, that '.'the self-existent being, 

 the supreme cause of all things, must of necessity have infinite 

 power." The ground of the demonstration is, that as " all the 

 powers of all things are derived from him, nothing can make any 

 difficulty or resistance to the execution of his will." It is de- 

 fined that the infinite power of the self-existent being does not 

 extend to the " making of a thing which implies a contradiction," 

 or the doing of that "which would imply imperfection (whether 

 natural or moral) in the being to whom such power is ascribed," 

 but that it does extend to the creation of matter, and of an im- 

 material, cogitative substance, endued with a power of beginning 

 motion, and with a liberty of will or choice. Upon this doctrine 

 of liberty it is contended that we are able to give a satisfactory 

 answer to "that ancient and great question, voOev TO KQICOV, 

 what is the cause and original of evil ?" The argument on this 

 head I shall briefly exhibit. 



" All that we call evil is either an evil of imperfection, as the 

 want of certain faculties or excellencies which other creatures 

 have ; or natural evil, as pain, death, and the like ; or moral evil, 

 as all kinds of vice. The first of these is not properly an evil ; 

 for every power, faculty, or perfection, which any creature enjoys, 

 being the free gift of God, . . it is plain the want of any certain 

 faculty or perfection in any kind of creatures, which never be- 

 longed to their natures is no more an evil to them, than their 

 never having been created or brought into being at all could pro- 

 perly have been called an evil. The second kind of evil, which 

 we call natural evil, is either a necessary consequence of the 



