206 CLARKE AND SPINOZA. [CHAP. XIII. 



former, as death to a creature on whose nature immortality was 

 never conferred ; and then it is no more properly an evil than the 

 former. Or else it is counterpoised on the whole with as great 

 or greater good, as the afflictions and sufferings of good men, 

 and then also it is not properly an evil; or else, lastly, it is a 

 punishment, and then it is a necessary consequence of the third 

 and last kind of evil, viz., moral evil. And this arises wholly 

 from the abuse of liberty which God gave to His creatures for 

 other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit to give them 

 for the perfection and order of the whole creation. Only they, 

 contrary to God's intention and command, have abused what was 

 necessary to the perfection of the whole, to the corruption and 

 depravation of themselves. And thus all sorts of evils have en- 

 tered into the world without any diminution to the infinite good- 

 ness of the Creator and Governor thereof." p. 112. 



The main premises of the above argument may be thus 

 stated : 



1st. All reputed evil is either evil of imperfection, or natural 

 evil, or moral evil. 



2nd. Evil of imperfection is not absolute evil. 



3rd. Natural evil is either a consequence of evil of imperfec- 

 tion, or it is compensated with greater good, or it is a conse- 

 quence of moral evil. 



4th. That which is either a consequence of evil of imperfec- 

 tion, or is compensated with greater good, is not absolute evil. 



5th. All absolute evils are included in reputed evils. 



To express these premises let us assume 



w = reputed evil. 



x = evil of imperfection. 



y = natural evil. 



z = moral evil. 



p = consequence of evil of imperfection. 



q = compensated with greater good. 



r = consequence of moral evil. 



t = absolute evil. 



Then, regarding the premises as Primary Propositions, of which 



