CHAP. XIII.] CLARKE AND SPINOZA. 213 



Other definitions are implied, and other axioms are virtually 

 assumed, in some of the demonstrations. Thus, in Prop, i., 

 " Substance is prior in nature to its affections," the proof of 

 which consists in a mere reference to Defs. 3 and 5, there seems 

 to be an assumption of the following axiom, viz., " That by which 

 a thing is conceived is prior in nature to the thing conceived." 

 Again, in the demonstration of Prop. v. the converse of this 

 axiom is assumed to be true. Many other examples of the same 

 kind occur. It is impossible, therefore, by the mere processes of 

 Logic, to deduce the whole of the conclusions of the first book of 

 the Ethics from the axioms and definitions which are prefixed to 

 it, and which are given above. In the brief analysis which will 

 follow, I shall endeavour to present in their proper order what 

 appear to me to. be the real premises, whether formally stated or 

 implied, and shall show ip what manner they involve the conclu- 

 sions to which Spinoza was led. 



17. I conceive, then, that in the course of his demonstration, 

 Spinoza effects several parallel divisions of the universe of pos- 

 sible existence, as, 



1st. Into things which are in themselves, #, and things which 

 are in some other thing, x\ whence, as these classes of thing toge- 

 ther make up the universe, we have 



x + x r = 1 ; (Ax. i.) 

 or, x = 1 - of. 



2nd. Into things which are conceived by themselves, y, and 

 things which are conceived through some other thing, #'; 



whence 



y=\-y'. (Ax. n.) 



3rd. Into substance, z, and modes, z' ; whence 



z=l-z'. (Def. in. v.) 

 4th. Into things free, jf, and things necessary, /'; whence 



/=!-/. (Def.vn.) 



5th. Into things which are causes and self-existent, e, and 

 things caused by some other thing, e\ whence 



e = 1 - e. (Def. i. Ax. vn.) 



