CHAP. XIII.] CLARKE AND SPINOZA. 215 



18. In Prop. v. it is endeavoured to show, that " There cannot 

 exist two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.'* 

 The proof is virtually as follows : If there are more substances 

 than one, they are distinguished either by attributes or modes ; 

 if by attributes, then there is only one substance of the same at- 

 tribute ; if by modes, then, laying aside these as non-essential, 

 there remains no real ground of distinction. Hence there exists 

 but one substance of the same attribute. The assumptions here 

 involved are inconsistent with those which are found in other 

 parts of the treatise. Thus substance, Def. iv., is apprehended 

 by the intellect through the means of attribute. By Def. vi. it 

 may have many attributes. One substance may, therefore, con- 

 ceivably be distinguished from another by a difference in some of 

 its attributes, while others remain the same. 



In Prop. viu. it is attempted to show that, All substance 

 is necessarily infinite. ^*The proof is as follows. There ex- 

 ists but one substance, of one attribute, Prop. v. ; and it per- 

 tains to its nature to exist, Prop. vn. It will, therefore, be of its 

 nature to exist either as finite or infinite. But not as finite, for, 

 by Def. n. it would require to be bounded by another substance 

 of the same nature, which also ought to exist necessarily, Prop, 

 vn. Therefore, there would be two substances of the same 

 attribute, which is absurd, Prop. v. Substance, therefore, is 

 infinite. 



In this demonstration the word " finite" is confounded with 

 the expression, " Finite in its own kind," Def. n. It is thus as- 

 sumed that nothing can be finite, unless it is bounded by another 

 thing of the same kind. This is not consistent with the ordi- 

 nary meaning of the term. Spinoza's use of the term finite 

 tends to make space the only form of substance, and all existing 

 things but affections of space, and this, I think, is really one of 

 the ultimate foundations of his system. 



The first scholium applied to the above Proposition is re- 

 markable. I give it in the original words : " Quum finitum esse 

 revera sit ex parte negatio, et infinitum absoluta affirmatio exis- 

 tentiae alicujus naturae, sequitur ergo ex sola Prop. vn. omnem 

 substantiam debere esse infinitam." Now this is in reality an 

 assertion of the principle affirmed by Clarke, and controverted by 



