CHAP. XIII.] CLARKE AND SPINOZA. 217 



of an Infinite Being, His attributes, and His relation to the uni- 

 verse. The fundamental principle of all such speculations, viz., that 

 whatever we can clearly conceive, must exist, fails to accomplish 

 its end, even when its truth is admitted. For how shall the finite 

 comprehend the infinite ? Yet must the possibility of such con- 

 ception be granted, and in something more than the sense of 

 a mere withdrawal of the limits of phenomenal existence, before 

 any solid ground can be established for the knowledge, d priori, 

 of things infinite and eternal. Spinoza's affirmation of the re- 

 ality of such knowledge is plain and explicit: " Mens humana 

 adaequatum habet cognitionem asternae et infinite essentiae Dei" 

 (Prop. XLVII., Part 2nd). Let this be compared with Prop, 

 xxxiv., Part 2nd : " Omnis idea quae in nobis est absoluta 

 sive adaequata et perfecta, vera est ;" and with Axiom vi., Part 

 1st, " Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire." Moreover, this 

 species of knowledge is made the essential constituent of all other 

 knowledge : " De natura rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis 

 specie percipere" (Prop. XLIV., Cor. n., Part 2nd). Were it 

 said, that there is a tendency in the human mind to rise in con- 

 templation from the particular towards the universal, from the 

 finite towards the infinite, from the transient towards the eternal ; 

 and that this tendency suggests to us, with high probability, the 

 existence of more than sense perceives or understanding compre- 

 hends ; the statement might be accepted as true for at least a 

 a large number of minds. There is, however, a class of specu- 

 lations, the character of which must be explained in part by 

 reference to other causes, impatience of probable or limited 

 knowledge, so often all that we can really attain to ; a desire for 

 absolute certainty where intimations sufficient to mark out before 

 us the path of duty, but not to satisfy the demands of the specu- 

 lative intellect, have alone been granted to us ; perhaps, too, 

 dissatisfaction with the present scene of things. With the 

 undue predominance of these motives, the more sober procedure 

 of analogy and probable induction falls into neglect. Yet the lat- 

 ter is, beyond all question, the course most adapted to our pre- 

 sent condition. To infer the existence of an intelligent cause 

 from the teeming evidences of surrounding design, to rise to the 

 conception of a moral Governor of the world, from the study of 



