402 CONSTITUTION OF THE INTELLECT. [CHAP. XXII. 



probable or analogical conclusions, but are entitled to be re- 

 garded as truths of science. Whether they be termed meta- 

 physical or not, is a matter of indifference. The nature of the 

 evidence upon which they rest, though in kind distinct, is not 

 inferior in value to any which can be adduced in support of the 

 general truths of physical science. 



Again, it is agreed that there is a certain order observ- 

 able in the progress of all the exacter forms of knowledge. 

 The study of every department of physical science begins with 

 observation, it advances by the collation of facts to a presump- 

 tive acquaintance with their connecting law, the validity of 

 such presumption it tests by new experiments so devised as to 

 augment, if the presumption be well founded, its probability in- 

 definitely ; and finally, the law of the phenomenon having been 

 with sufficient confidence determined, the investigation of causes, 

 conducted by the due mixture of hypothesis and deduction, 

 crowns the inquiry. In this advancing order of knowledge, the 

 particular faculties and laws whose nature has been considered 

 in this work bear their part. It is evident, therefore, that if we 

 would impartially investigate either the nature of science, or 

 the intellectual constitution in its relation to science, no part of 

 the two series above presented ought to be regarded as isolated. 

 More especially ought those truths which stand in any kind of 

 supplemental relation to each other to be considered in their mu- 

 tual bearing and connexion. 



4. Thus the necessity of an experimental basis for all positive 

 knowledge, viewed in connexion with the existence and the 

 peculiar character of that system of mental laws, and principles, 

 and operations, to which attention has been directed, tends to 

 throw light upon some important questions by which the world 

 of speculative thought is still in a great measure divided. How, 

 from the particular facts which experience presents, do we arrive 

 at the general propositions of science ? What is the nature of 

 these propositions? Are they solely the collections of experi- 

 ence, or does the mind supply some connecting principle of its 

 own? In a word, what is the nature of scientific truth, and 

 what are the grounds of that confidence with which it claims to 

 be received? 



