CHAP. XXII.] CONSTITUTION OF THE INTELLECT. 419 



and saddened the thoughtful in all ages, still less does it enable 

 us to rise above the present conditions of our being, or lend its 

 sanction to the doctrine which affirms the possibility of an in- 

 tuitive knowledge of the infinite, and the unconditioned, whe- 

 ther such knowledge be sought for in the realm of Nature, or 

 above that realm. We can never be said to comprehend that 

 which is represented to thought as the limit of an indefinite 

 process of abstraction. A progression ad inftnitum is impos- 

 sible to finite powers. But though we cannot comprehend the 

 infinite, there may be even scientific grounds for believing that 

 human nature is constituted in some relation to the infinite. We 

 cannot perfectly express the laws of thought, or establish in the 

 most general sense the methods of which they form the basis, with- 

 out at least the implication of elements which ordinary language 

 expresses by the terms " Universe" and " Eternity." As in the 

 pure abstractions of Geometry, so in the domain of Logic it is 

 seen, that the empire of Truth is, in a certain sense, larger than 

 that of Imagination. And as there are many special departments 

 of knowledge which can only be completely surveyed from an ex- 

 ternal point, so the theory of the intellectual processes, as applied 

 only to finite objects, seems to involve the recognition of a 

 sphere of thought from which all limits are withdrawn. If then, 

 on the one hand, we cannot discover in the laws of thought and 

 their analogies a sufficient basis of proof for the conclusions of 

 a too daring mysticism ; on the other hand we should err in re 

 garding them as wholly unsuggestive. As parts of our intellec- 

 tual nature, it seems not improbable that they should manifest 

 their presence otherwise than by merely prescribing the condi- 

 tions of formal inference. Whatever grounds we have for con- 

 necting them with the peculiar tendencies of physical speculation 

 among the Ionian and Italic philosophers, the same grounds 

 exist for associating them with a disposition of thought at once 

 more common and more legitimate. To no casual influences, at 

 least, ought we to attribute that meditative spirit which then 

 most delights to commune with the external magnificence of 

 Nature, when most impressed with the consciousness of sempi- 

 ternal verities, which reads in the nocturnal heavens a bright 

 manifestation of order ; or feels in some wild scene among the 



