98 CONQUEST OF MYSORE. 



proach Seringapatam. He began his march on the 1st 

 February, 1792, and by proceeding in three lines instead 

 of one, with his ordnance and heavy baggage in the centre, 

 his infantry and light troops on the flanks, he avoided 

 much of the annoyance hitherto experienced from the at- 

 tacks of an active enemy. 



On the 5th of the month, the English army, having 

 reached a range of heights, discovered the Mysorean capi- 

 tal, in front of which Tippoo, with his whole force, amount- 

 ing to between 40 and 50,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry, 

 appeared strongly intrenched. In Colonel Wilks's opinion, 

 he would have practised with greater advantage his early 

 system of desultory warfare, by throwing into the capital 

 a strong garrison under a faithful commander, while he 

 himself, with his light cavalry, might have endeavoured to 

 intercept the supplies and communications of the enemy. 

 The sultan, however, it is probable, fully trusted to the 

 strength of his present position, and also hoped, by main- 

 taining it, that he might weary out and finally exhaust his 

 antagonist, in the same manner as Hyder, in 1767, had 

 baffled the formidable invasion of the Mahrattas. His en- 

 campment was exceedingly strong, covered in front by a 

 thick bamboo-hedge and by a small river and canal, while 

 the actual position of his army was secured in front by a 

 fortified hill and a chain of redoubts, and its rear by the 

 works of the city and island, which, at the same time, 

 afforded a secure retreat. This situation was such, as, in 

 the opinion of many, and particularly of all the native 

 officers, precluded every idea of attack. Lord Cornwallis, 

 however, considered that while his movements were de- 

 layed, this intrenchment would be continually strengthened 

 by new works, and that his own situation, amid a hostile 

 country and allies so little to be trusted, would become 

 always more difficult and precarious. He determined, there- 

 fore, to make an immediate and general attack ; though it 

 appeared necessary, as in the storming of a fortress, to 

 carry on his operations under cover of night, when the 

 batteries by which the camp was defended could not be di- 

 rected with any degree of precision. 



The troops to be employed in this hazardous service 

 were divided into three columns, under General Medows, 

 Colonels Stuart and Maxwell ; the commander with the 



