114 CONQUEST OF MYSORE. 



Sedaseer, to observe any signal which might be made by 

 the eastern army. Much surprise was felt when a number 

 of tents appeared on the ground in front, which gradually 

 swelled to several hundreds, and composed a formidable en- 

 campment. Among others, belonging apparently to chiefs 

 of distinction, there was one very large and covered with 

 green, which was concluded to be. that of the sultan him- 

 self. Yet this was so contrary to all previous intelligence, 

 that General Stuart merely reinforced the party on the hill 

 with a battalion, and waited to act according to circum- 

 stances. At daybreak, General Hartley, from a height, 

 discovered an appearance of activity among the opposite 

 troops. It does not appear to us very clear why the com- 

 mander did not immediately concentrate his forces, by either 

 marching forward himself, or ordering the advance under 

 Montresor to fall back. In fact the Indian army penetrated 

 through the jungle with such secrecy and expedition, that 

 between nine and ten in the morning they had completely 

 surrounded that officer's brigade, attacking it at once in 

 front and rear. It maintained most gallantly an arduous 

 conflict till after two o'clock, when General Stuart came up, 

 and after a brisk charge obliged the enemy to retreat in all 

 directions through the thicket. The advanced corps being 

 immediately withdrawn, Tippoo had a pretence for claim- 

 ing a victory ; but the casualties on our aide, which 

 amounted only to 29 killed, 98 wounded, and 16 missing, 

 sufficiently showed that he had failed in his object of strik- 

 ing a decisive blow. Even by his own statement, his loss 

 included several chiefs of rank. This was the last action 

 in which Tippoo displayed his military genius. He effected 

 a complete surprise, and the destruction of the English 

 corps was averted only by its own extraordinary valour and 

 the inferiority of the Indian troops in pitched battle. 



The sultan hastened back to oppose the main army ad- 

 vancing against him from Coromandel. It might now have 

 appeared evident that his only resource was, by recurring 

 to the ancient military policy oi' his house, to throw a strong 

 garrison into Seringapatam, to keep the field with lar<re 

 bodies of cavalry, and by continual movements to intercept 

 the enemy's communications, cut off his supplies, and sur- 

 prise his detachments. He might thus either have defended 

 his capital, or have remained powerful after its fall. His 



