46 SOME REMARKS ON THE 



namely in which the centres of force are discrete and at in- 

 sensible distances from each other, I now shall attempt to show 

 what ulterior developements it admits of, and how by means of 

 these the error noticed at the close of the last Section, namely, 

 the confounding the admission that all phenomena are to be 

 explained cinematically with the assertion that they can all be 

 explained mechanically may be met, and, as it seems to me, 

 sufficiently refuted. 



9. I begin by observing that though we speak and shall 

 continue to do so of the action of matter on matter, yet that no 

 part of the views I am about to state depends on the hypothesis 

 we adopt touching the nature of causation. They would remain 

 unchanged whether we accept a theory of pre-established har- 

 mony, or one of physical influence, or whether we abstain from 

 all theories on the subject. This being understood, we may, 

 I think, lay down the axiom that whatever property we ascribe 

 to matter, we may also ascribe to it, the property of producing 

 in other portions of matter the former property. Of this axiom 

 the present state of Boscovich's theory affords a familiar illustra- 

 tion. Every portion of matter is locally moveable, therefore we 

 may ascribe to any portion of matter the power of producing 

 motion in any other, hereby giving rise to the whole doctrine of 

 attractive and repulsive forces. At this point we have hitherto 

 stopped, but for no satisfactory reason. We may proceed farther, 

 and we are therefore bound, in constructing the most general 

 possible hypothesis, to do so : we may ascribe to each portion of 

 matter the power of engendering in any other that which we 

 call force, in other words the power of producing the power of 

 actuating the potential mobility of matter. It is not a priori at 

 all more easy to conceive that A should have the power of 

 setting B in motion, or of changing the velocity it already has, 

 than that G should have the power of enabling A to act on B, 

 or of changing the mode of action which A already possesses. 

 And let it be observed, that the new power thus ascribed to G 

 is as distinct from force, as force is from velocity. The two are 

 related as cause and effect, but formally are wholly independent. 

 Now unless this hypothetically possible mode of action can be 

 shown to have 110 existence in rerum naturd, it is clear that 

 the inference from the conclusion that no phenomenon can be 



