CHAP. IV.] DIVISION Of K AT URAL PHILOSOPHY. 123 



the strict union betwixt causes and effects ; so that the ex- 

 planation of them must, in some measure, be coupled 

 together : but as all solid and fruitful natural philosophy 

 hath both an ascending and a descending scale of parts," 

 leading from experience to axioms, aTid from axioms to new 

 discoveries, it seems most advisable here, in the division of 

 sciences, to separate speculation from operation, and treat 

 them distinct. 



CHAPTER IV. 



Division of the Speculative Branch of Natural Philosophy into Physici 

 and Metaphysics. Physics relate to the Investigation of Efficient 

 Causes and Matter ; Metaphysics to that of Final Causes and the 

 Form. Division of Physics into the Sciences of the Principles of 

 Things, the Structure of Things, and the Variety of Things. Division 

 of Physics in relation to the Variety of Things into Abstract and 

 Concrete. Division of Concretes agrees with the Distribution of the 

 Parts of Natural History. Division of Abstracts into the Doctrine 

 of Material Forms and Motion. Appendix of Speculative Physics 

 twofold : viz.. Natural Problems and the Opinions of Ancient Philo- 

 sophers. Metaphj'^sics divided into the Knowledge of Forms and the 

 Doctrine of Final Causes. 



The speculative or theoretical pai-t of natural philosophy 

 we divide into physics and metaphysics ; taking the word 

 metaphysics in a sense different from that received. And 

 here we must, once for all, declare, as to our use of words, 

 that though our conceptions and notions are new, and 

 different from the common, yet we religiously retain the 

 ancient forms of speech ; for as we hope that the method, 

 and clear explanation, we endeavour at, will free us from any 

 misconstruction that might arise from an ill choice of words : 

 BO in everything else, it is our desire, as much as possible, 

 without prejudice to truth and the sciences, not to deviate 

 from ancient opinions and forms of speech. And here I 

 cannot but wonder that Aristotle should proceed in such a 

 spirit of contradiction, as he did to all antiquity ; not only 

 coining new terms of science at pleasure, but endeavouring 

 to abolish all the knowledge of the ancients; so that he 

 never mentions any ancient author but to reprove him, nor 

 opinion but to confute it ; which is the ready way to pror 

 cure fame and followers. For certainly it happens in philo- 

 Bophical, as it does in divine truth : '< I came in the namt 



