142 ADVANCEMENT OP LEARNING. [bOOK III. 



in his stead ; and, at the same time, receiving final causes 

 through his affection to logic, not theology. 



These final causes, however, are not false, or unworthy of 

 inquiry in metaphysics, but their excursion into the limits of 

 physical causes hath made a great devastation in that pro- 

 vince ; otherwise, when contained within their own bounds, 



Spinozist principle which the text attributes to the Stagyrite has been 

 understood by many critics oi the sensational school to intimate that 

 Aristotle was of their way of thinking, though the idea of an independent 

 material intelligence is expressly contradicted by numerous passages in 

 his Metaphysics. In book xii. chap. 5, of the works which go under 

 this name, the principal being is held to exclude the idea oi matter from 

 his nature: tri roivvv Tavrag dn ovcriag tlvai dvev i5\77^' d'idiovg yap 

 Cfl' K.T.X.; and (ibid. 8) ro ok ri ijv dvai ovk t%£i v\t}v to rrpuiTov' 

 ivrtXtxita yap. In chap. 7 he affirms this principle to be spirit, — apx>) 

 y voTicTig; that matter cannot move oi itself, but needs the action oi an 

 excerior agent, — ov yap t) ye vXrj Kivrjan avrt) kavTqv, dWd TtKTOviKr]' 

 and that this principle must be eternal and active, — 'Atciov koI ovcria 

 Kai tvkpyna ovaa. Aristotle further proceeds to show that all other 

 beings are only a species of means transmitting the motion to others 

 which have been communicated to them, but that this primary being, 

 possessing the spring of motion in itself, moves without being moved; 

 illustrating this kind of action by the emotions and deeds that spring from 

 the love, pity, or hatred that agents at rest excite in others. In another 

 place he' affirms that this being is not only eternal in duration but 

 immutable in essence, and quite distinct from sensible things ; on yap 

 tariv ovaia Tig dtdiog /cut ciKii^TjTog xai Ktx^piaii'ivr] tCjv aioQriTioi', 

 <pavep6v Ik twv ftprjfxsvujv' and that heaven and nature hang upon its 

 behests, — U ToiavTijg dpa dpxng ypTTjTaL 6 ovpavug icai i) (pvaig. He 

 further shows that life belongs to it by essence, and as the action of 

 intelligence is life, and vice versd, essential action constitutes the eternal 

 life of this being. Aristotle then calls this independent principle Goa, 

 and assigns to it endless duration: (pafikv ck tov GEO'N tlvai ^Cjov dtdiov 

 dpiOTov. "It remains," says the Stagyrite, "to determine whether 

 this principle be one or several ; but upon this point we need only 

 remember that those who have decided for a plurality have advanced 

 nothing worthy of consideration in support of their belief." — 'AXXa 

 (lEfivi'iaOaL Kal Tag tCjv dWiov cnroipdcTtig oti Trepl TrXrjQovg ovce tlorj- 

 Kaaiv 6 Ti Kal aa(ptg tiirtiv. (Ibid. chap. 8.) "For the principle oi exist- 

 ence, or the immovable being which is the source of all movement, 

 being pure action, and consequently foreign to matter, is one in reason 

 and number .... all the rest is the creation of a mythology invented 

 by politicians to advance the public interest and occupy the attention of 

 mankind." To ^k tl ijv tlvai ovk Ixh 'vXr)v to TrpuJrov ivreXkxna. yap. 

 (Supp. note 1.) "Ev fiev dpa Kal Xoyy Kal dpiQfXi^ to Trpwroj/ Kivoiiv 

 aKivTjTOV. (Ibid. chap. 8.) Td dk Xonrd ixv6iKu)g ijdt] Trpoarjx^ri Trpbg rijv 

 ireiOoj Twv TToXXwv Kai rrpbg Tt)v tig roiig voj-iovg Kal ro avufipov 

 Xprjtnv. (Ibid.) Ed. 



