182 Advancement oi? t.fcARNtN^o. fcco'c v. 



iaiagiilatioa before the decree is executed : for imagination 

 always precedes and excites voluntary motion, and is there- 

 fore a common instrument both to the reason and the will, 

 only it has two faces : that turned towards reason bearing 

 the effigy of truth ; but that towards action the ef^gy of 

 ^joodness : yet they are faces : — 



** quales decet esse soronim."* 



But the imagination is more than a mere messenger ; as 

 being invested with, or, at least, usurping no small authority, 

 besides delivering the message. Thus, Aristotle well ob- 

 serves, that the mind has the same command over the body, 

 as the master over the slave ; but reason over the imagi- 

 nation, the same that a magistrate has over a free citizen, who 

 may come to rule in his turn.^ For in matters of faith and 

 religion, the imagination mounts above reason. Not that 

 divine illumination is seated in the imagination, but, as in 

 divine virtues, grace makes use of the motions of the will ; 

 so in illumination it makes use of the motions of the imagi- 

 nation; whence religion solicits access to the mind, by simili- 

 tudes, types, parables, dreams, and visions. Again, the 

 imagination has a considerable sway in persuasion, insinuated 

 by the power of eloquence : for when the mind is soothed, 

 enraged, or any way drawn aside by the artifice of speech, 

 all this is done by raising the imagination ; which, now 

 growing unruly, not only insults over, but, in a manner, offers 

 violence to reason, partly by blinding, partly by incensing it. 

 Yet there appears no cause why we should quit our former 

 division : for in general, the imagination does not make 

 the sciences; since even poetry, wliich has been always attri- 

 buted to the imagination, should be esteemed rather a play 

 of wit than a science. As for the power ot the imagination 

 in natural things, we have already ranged it under the doc- 

 trine of the soul ; and for its affinity with rhetoric, we refer 

 it to the art of rhetoric. 



This part of human philosophy which regards logic, is 

 disagreeable to the taste of many, as appearing to them no 

 other than a net, and a snare of thorny subtilty. For as 

 knowledge is justly called the food of the mind, so in the 

 desire and choice of this food, most men have the appetite 



• Ovid, Metwn. ii. 14. * AriatotJc'c Pol- tics, i. 5, 6. 



