CttAl». II ] METHOD DOCTRtNAL Ain> INITIATIVE. 227 



Let the first difference of metliod be, tlierefore, betwixt 

 the doctrinal and initiative. By this we do not mean that 

 the initiative method should treat only of the entrance into 

 the sciences, and the other their entire doctrine ; but bor- 

 rowing the word from religion, we call that method initia- 

 tive which opens and reveals the mysteries of the sciences ; 

 80 that as the doctrinal method teaches, the initiative method 

 should intimate, the doctrinal method requiring a belief of 

 what is delivered, but the initiative rather that it should be 

 examined. The one deals out the sciences to vulgar learnere, 

 the other as to the children of wisdom, — the one ha\dng for 

 its end the use of the sciences as they now stand, and the 

 other their progi-ess and farther advancement. But this 

 latter method seems deserted ; for the sciences have hitherto 

 been delivered as if both the teacher and the learner desired 

 to receive errors by consent, — the teacher pursuing that 

 method which procures the greatest belief to his doctrine, 

 not that which most commodiously submits it to examina- 

 tion, whilst the learner desires present satisfaction without 

 waiting for a just inquiry, as if more concerned not to doubt 

 than not to mistake. Hence the master, through desire of 

 glory, never exposes the weakness of his own science, and 

 the scholar, through his aversion to labour, tries not his own 

 strength ; whereas knowledge, which is delivered to others 

 as a web to be further wove, should if possible be introduced 

 into the mind of another in the manner it was first pro- 

 cured; and this may be done in knowledge acquired by 



It is evident, however, that the dichotomous process can only be employed 

 in the investigation of subjects which admit of a twofold contradictory 

 division, and that where the primitive elements are composed of four or 

 tive distinct members, the method is totally inapplicable. Its use, there- 

 fore, ought to be attenrled with the greatest caution, as the Eamist can 

 hardly be certain that the twofold division, in many cases, is not 

 more apparent than real, and that a further analysis would not neces- 

 sitate a multiform classification. For want of this foresight. Ramus, 

 with all his subtilty, falls into inconceivable errors, and a great many 

 of Bacon's exemplifications of his method in the crucial instance aro 

 direct paralogisms. Milton framed a logic on the model of Ramus s 

 method, seduced rather by the bold antagonism of the latter against 

 Aristotle, than by its philosopliic justness. Both the original and the 

 copy are now forgotten, and Ramus is committed to the judgment o< 

 posterity rather on his absurdities thaa his merits. See Hooker, i. S, 

 with Keble's note. £d. 



