CHAP, lit] RHETORICAL SOPHISMS EXEMPLIFIED. 247 



not less to be chosen for itself, because it needs the spur of 

 lame and reputation, which clearly confutes the sophism. 



XI. — What is procured by our own virtue and industry is a greater good ; 

 and what by another's, or by the gift oj fortune, a less. 



The reasons are, — 1. Future hope, because in the favours 

 of others, or the gifts of fortune, there is no great certainty ; 

 but our own virtue and abilities are always \ni\\ us : so that 

 when they have purchased us one good, we have them as 

 ready, and by use better edged to procure us another. 

 2. Because what we enjoy by the benefit of others carries 

 with it an obligation to them for it, whereas what is derived 

 from ourselves comes without clog or incumbrance. Nay, 

 when the Divine Providence bestows favours upon us, they 

 require acknowledgments and a kind ol retribution to the 

 Supreme Being ; but in the other kind, men rejoice (as the 

 prophet speaks), and are glad ; they offer to their toils, and 

 sacrifice to their nets. ^ 3, Because what comes to us unpro- 

 cured by our own virtue, yields not that praise and reputation 

 we affect; for actions of great felicity may produce much 

 wonder, but no praise : so Cicero said to Ctesar, '• We have 

 enough to admire, but want somewhat to praise."? 4. Be- 

 cause the purchases of our own industry are commonly 

 joined with labour and struggle, which have not only some 

 sweetness themselves, but give an edge and relish to enjoy- 

 ment. Venison is sweet to him that kills it.'' 



There are four opposites or counter-colours to this sophism, 

 and may serve as confutations to the four preceding coloui"s 

 resi)ectively. 1. Because felicity seems to be a work of the 

 Divine favour, and accordingly begets confidence and alacrity 

 in ourselves, as well as respect and reverence from others. 

 And this felicity extends to casual things, which human 

 virtue can hardly reach. So when Gsesar said to the master 

 of the ship in a storm, " Thou carriest Caesar and his for- 

 tune ;" if he should have said, " Thou carriest Caesar and hia 

 virtue,'' it had been but a small support against the danger. 

 2. Because those things which proceed from virtue and in- 

 dustry are imitable, and lie o^^en to others ; whereas felicity 

 is inimitable, and the prerogative of a singular person : 



' Habac. i. 15, 16. 



f " Quae miremur habemus, quae laudemus expectamus." — Orat. pra 

 liarcellui, * Suavia cibus 4 venatiu 



