BOOK II.] SINGULAR INSTANCES. 499 



U8, but yet in tlicir nature singular, so should we proceed with 

 the singular instances of art. 



.For example : paper, a very common substance, is a singular 

 instance of art; for if you consider the subject attentively, you 

 will find that artificial substances are either woven by straight 

 and transverse lines, as silk, woollen, or linen cloth, and the like; 

 or coagulated from concrete juices, such as brick, earthenware, 

 glass, enamel, porcelain, and the like, which admit of a polish if 

 they be compact, but if not, become hard without being polished; 

 all which latter substances are brittle, and not adherent or tena- 

 cious. On the contrary, paper is a tenacious substance, which 

 can be cut and torn, so as to resemble and almost rival the skin 

 of any animal, or the leaf of vegetables, and the like works of 

 nature ; being neither brittle like glass, nor woven like cloth, but 

 having fibres and not distinct threads, just as natural substances, 

 BO that scarcely anything similar can be found amongst artificial 

 substances, and it is absolutely singular. And in artificial works 

 we should certainly prefer those which approacli the nearest to 

 an imitation of nature, or, on the other hand, powerfully govern 

 and change her course. 



Again, in these instances which we term the wit and hands of 

 man, charms and conjuring should not be altogether despised, 

 for although mere amusements, and of little use, yet they may 

 afl^ord considerable information. 



Lastly, superstition and magic (in its common acceptation) 

 9.re not to be entirely omitted ; for although they be overwhelmed 

 by a mass of lies and fables, yet some investigation should be 

 made, to see if there be really any latent natural operation in 

 them ; as in fascination, and the fortifying of the imagination, 

 the sympathy of distant objects, the transmission of impressions 

 from spirit to spirit no less than from body to body, and the like. 



XXXII. From the foregoing remarks, it is clear that the five 

 last species of instances (the similar, singular, deviating, and bor- 

 dering instances, and those of power) should not be reserved for 

 the investigation of any given nature, as the preceding and many 

 of the succeeding instances must, but a collection of them should 

 be made at once, in the style of a particular history, so that they 

 may arrange the matter which enters the understanding, and 

 correct its depraved habit, for it is necessarily imbued, corrupted, 

 perverted, and distorted by daily and habitual impressions. 



They are to be used, therefore, as a preparative, for the pur- 

 pose of rectifying and purifying the understanding ; for whatever 

 withdraws it from habit, levels and planes down its surface foi" 

 the reception of the dry and pure light of true notions. 



These instances, moreover, level and prepare the way for tb*> 

 operative branch, as we will mention in its proper p^ace when 

 jpcaking of the praptical deductions. 



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