16 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



original form of the work. It appeared to have been a redan, with a pan-coupe, the right face 

 flanked by the Malakoif, the left by the Little Redan, the pan-coupe by the Sapoune redoubts ; 

 yet it is not improbable that it was a lunette. The Sapoune redoubts appear to have been 

 lunettes, with a command of 7', the ditch 5' deep and 12' wide, a glacis 2' in height. Even in 

 these detached works excellent bomb proofs were provided. 



The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of fleches, united by a simple trench. 



The famous rifle jiits varied much in cliaracter. Sometimes they consisted merely of a little 

 pile of stones, or two gabions, placed on their sides, forming an angle merely sufficient to shelter 

 one man ; at other times, of a hole in the ground for four or five men ; again, of semicircles or 

 fleches capable of holding from ten to forty men. 



In front of the Volhynian redoubt there were two lines of these semicircular shelters, uniting 

 at an acute angle about two hundred and fifty yards in advance of the work, and extending 

 across the ridge. In advance of the angle were two rows of small ones for one or two men each. 

 These particular semicircles were eight paces wide at the gorge, had a parapet 4' high, the 

 interior being excavated. In many cases these pits were thrown much further in advance, and 

 in very exposed situations. They contributed very materially towards impeding the progress 

 of the approaches. 



From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences of Sebastopol, it will appear 

 how little foundation there was for the generally received accounts of the stupendous dimensions 

 of the works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The plain truth is that 

 these defences were simple temporary fortifications of rather greater dimensions than usual, and 

 that not a single new principle of engineering was there developed. It is true that there were 

 several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of the iron tanks, &c.; but the 

 whole merit consisted in the admirable adaptation of well known principles to the peculiar 

 locality and circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various 

 works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing tliat, if Todtleben 

 were called xipon to do the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close 

 flanking arrangements. 



These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the reputation of the Russian 

 engineer. His labors and their results will be handed down in history as the most triumphant 

 and enduring monument of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the 

 first rank of military engineers. But in our admiration of the talent and energy of the engi- 

 neer, it must not be forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would have been useless 

 without the skilful artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places 

 than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and well combined attacks than that 

 to which it was subjected. There can be no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege 

 of Sebastopol called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has ever yet 



occurred. 



This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy which, for a time at least, 

 gained extensive credence. It was, that the siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of tempo- 

 rary (earthen) fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that it proved 

 nothing of the kind, but that it only proved that temporary works in the hands of a brave and 

 skilful garrison are susceptible of a longer defence than was generally supposed. They were 

 attacked as field works never were before, and were defended as field works never had been 

 defended. The main difterence between properly constructed permanent fortifications (intended 

 to resist a siege) and temporary works is, that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle 



