REPORT OF CAPT. GEORGE B. MTLELLAN. 17 



against assault, "while tlie former always do. In addition, permanent works have a hetter 

 command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully and perfectly planned. The 

 masonry walls, which render an assault impossihle, cannot he seen from the distance, and can 

 he destroyed onlj' hy estahlishing hatteries on the crest of the glacis or the edge of the ditch; 

 the earthen jmraj^ets alone being visible beyond that point, they may, until the besiegers 

 arrive there, be regarded in the same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison 

 are not harassed hy the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an assault. Now, in the 

 siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers never reached the edge of the ditch ; so that, 

 had the fortification been a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the 

 siege remained to be undertaken, viz: the crowning of the covered way, the establishment of the 

 breach batteries, the descent and passage of the ditch, and the assault of the breach ; in other 

 words, at the moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal, 

 the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into play. 



Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was rmder existing circum- 

 stances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September, would not yet have been in a condition to crown 

 the covered way, the siege would certainly have extended into the winter ; and it may even be 

 doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, imtil the allies were in sufficient force 

 to invest the north as well as the south side. 



From the fleet and the naval arsenals were undoubtedly derived the means of arming and equip- 

 ping the land defences ; on many occasions the fire of the vessels up the ravines, as well as their 

 vertical fire, was probably attended with effect, yet I can see no reason to coincide in the opinion that 

 the presence of the fleet justified the allies in failing to advance upon the town immediately after 

 their arrival in front of it. No doubt the fire of the vessels would have rendered it impossihle 

 for the allies to have occupied immediately the lower parts of the town and the shores of the 

 harbor, but the nature of the ground was such that they could have opposed no serious resistance 

 to the allied occupation of the positions subsequently occupied by the Malakofi", Eedan, and Flag- 

 staff Bastion. Once holding these points, it would have been easy for the allies to establish 

 batteries commanding at once the fleet and the town ; defence would have been impossible, and 

 the opening of their fire must liave been the signal alike for the destruction of the fleet and the 

 evacuation of the south side. 



We will now pass to the woi'ks of attack. 



So great was their extent, some 6 miles from the extreme right to the furthest left, with a 

 development that has been stated, probably without exaggeration, to exceed 40 miles, and so 

 broken was the ground over whicli they stretched, that it is impossible to give in a report like 

 this anything approaching to a definite idea of their plan. An endeavor will be made merely to 

 point out how far the besiegers departed from, or conformed to, their established systems for 

 works of this nature. 



As the selection of the points of attack, and the positions to he occupied to cover the sieo-e 

 must first have engaged the attention of the allied commanders, they will naturally be the first 

 objects for our consideration. 



In the determination of the position for covering the siege there were two things to be con- 

 sidered : 1st, the power of resisting the efforts of a relieving army ; 2d, the facility of brincino- 

 up to the front the various supplies required in the operations. 



The strength of the position afforded by the plateau of the Chersonese has already been 

 referred to ; with the small force at first present on the part of the allies, it is certain that their 

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