18 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



position -would have teen much stronger and more secure had they confined themselves to the 

 occupation of the plateau, holding the valleys to the east only hy detachments to observe the 

 enemy. The English, supposing tliat their position and point of attack remained as it was, 

 would have had a somewhat greater distance to pass over in the transportation of their supplies ; 

 hut hy abandoning Balaklava for Kazatch they would have obtained a much more extensive and 

 convenient harbor, and the united efforts of the two armies would have enabled them to con- 

 struct, in ample season, a good road for the passage of their trains. Had the siege been under- 

 taken by a French army alone, it can scarcely be doubted that Kamiesch and Kazatch would 

 have been used to the exclusion of Balaklava ; at all events, Balaklava would have been employed 

 only as a temporary depot, when the roads were good and the enemy at a distance ; here the 

 insuperable evils of a divided command probably intervened. In this case the barren and 

 disastrous day of Balaklava would never have occurred ; the force and labor emi^loyed in protect- 

 ing Balaklava would have placed the position of Inkermann in such a state of defence as either to 

 have deterred the Russians from engaging in the battle or to have secured the victory to the 

 allies without the frightful cost and great uncertainty attending that eventful contest. 



In the actual condition of affairs, if either on the 25th October or the 5th November the 

 Russians had succeeded in carrying Balaklava, the English army would have been reduced to 

 the most desperate extremity by the total loss of all its supplies and means of transportation. 

 It is possible that the result would have been the total abandonment of the siege, and a retreat 

 upon Kamiesch, to embark there as rapidly as transportation could be obtained. 



To anticipate objections, it may be stated that, during the winter of 1854 and 1855, no sup- 

 plies were drawn from the country beyond Balaklava, and that the only advantages derived 

 from its occupation were : inextricable confusion in unloading vessels and despatching supplies, 

 arising I'rom the want of size of the harbor and the steepness of its banks ; wretched roads over 

 the muddy soil ; a steep ascent to be overcome in reaching the plateau ; finally, the constant 

 and lively anticipation of being entirely deprived of these uncertain advantages upon the first 

 resolute attack by the enemy in force. The most probable reasons for the selection of Balaklava 

 as the English depot are, that it was somewhat nearer the position on the plateau ; that it was 

 not taken by the French ; and that since it existed, it would be a pity that it should remain 

 idle. 



We may now turn to the point of attack. 



The facts of the case are well known. For many months the operations of the French were 

 directed entirely against the Flag-staff and Central Bastions, the English being engaged in 

 what may be termed two false attacks against the Eedan. 



It was not until the spring of 1855 that the efforts of the French were at last turned towards 

 securing possession of the Malakoff. 



To ap2>reciate the merits of this question, it is necessary again to refer to the map to bear in 

 mind that the heights overlooking the Karabelnaia were considerably more elevated than those 

 bordering upon the main city, and that the docks and other naval, as well as military establish- 

 ments, were all located in the Karabelnaia suburb. 



Were the Flag-staff Bastion carried, but a single step was gained ; beyond it existed at least 

 two lines of defence, both difficult to carry, before even the main city was reached. While 

 these new approaches were being constructed, it would have been a simple matter for the 

 Russians to border the commanding heights of the Karabelnaia with new batteries directed 

 against the town ; the fire from these, together with that from the works on the north side, 

 would have rendered the victors very uncomfortable and insecure in their barren conquest ; and 



