22 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE. 



must eacli be regarded as a masterpiece of its kind, deserving the closest study. It is difficult 

 to imagine what point in eitlier can be criticized, for both evinced consummate skill, discipline, 

 coolness, and courage. With regard to the artillery, I would merely remark tliat the Russian 

 guns were not of unusual calibre, consisting chiefly of 24, 32, and 42-pounders; and that the 

 termination of the siege was mainly due to the extensive use of mortars finally resorted to by 

 the allies. If they had been emploj^ed in the beginning as the main reliance, the siege would 

 have been of shorter duration. 



The causes of the unusual duration of this siege naturally resolve themselves into three 

 classes : the skilful disposition of the Russians, tlie faults of the allies, and natural causes 

 beyond the control of either party. Among the latter may be mentioned the natural strength 

 of the position and the severity of the winter. In the first class, there may be alluded to : the 

 skill with which the Russian engineers availed themselves of the nature of the ground ; the 

 moral courage which induced them to undertake the defence of an open town with a weak 

 garrison ; the constant use they made of sorties, among which may properly be classed the 

 battles of Balaklava, Inkermann, and the Tchernaya ; the ready ingenuity with which they 

 availed themselves of the resources derived from the fleet ; the fine practice of their artillery ; 

 their just appreciation of the true use of field works, and the admirable courage they always 

 evinced in standing to their works to repel assaults at the point of the bayonet ; the employment 

 of rifle pits on an extensive scale ; finally, the constant reinforcements which they soon com- 

 menced receiving, and which enabled them to fill the gaps made in their ranks by disease and 

 the projectiles of the allies. 



The evidences of skill on the part of the allies, as well as the apparent faults on all sides, 

 having been already alluded to, it is believed that the means have been furnished to enable any 

 one to draw his own conclusions as to the history of this memorable passage of arms. 



At different times during the siege a vast amount of labor was bestowed upon field works in 

 front of Kamiesch and Balaklava, near the Inkermann, on the northern and eastern borders of 

 the plateau, and along the Tchernaya ; these works varied much in strength and character, 

 sometimes consisting of continuous lines, again of detached redoubts. 



The redoubts generally had ditches about 10' wide and 6' deep. In many cases these works 

 were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent danger had demonstrated their 

 necessity. 



The line in front of Kamiesch consisted of 8 pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry 

 parapet ; it ran from Streletzka bay nearly south to the sea, passing at a little more than a mile 

 from the harbor of Kamiesch ; it was never completely finished. 



The position of the Russians, after the evacuation of the south side, was one of exceeding 

 strength ; their establishments were covered by Fort Sivernaia (a permanent work) and long 

 lines of strong earthen batteries, which would have required a siege to reduce them. 



The steep declivity of Mackenzie's heights, accessible at but a few j^oints, all of which were 

 strongly guarded, rendered the approach from the south a matter of extreme difficulty; it would 

 appear that the allies were wise in refusing to attempt to force the passage, iinless the efi'ort had 

 been made immediately after the fall of the Malakoft', before the Russians recovered from the shock. 



Efforts were made to turn the extreme Russian left by the valley of Baidar, but they only 

 served to ascertain the hopelessness of the undertaking. 



Tlie detached operations against Kinburn, Eupatoria, Kertch, the sea of AzofP, &c. , cannot be 

 regarded as having produced any effect upon the general result of the war ; they served chiefly 



